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Abstract 
We here expand the static tax competition models in symmetric small regions, which 
were indicated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), to a dynamic tax 
competition model in large regions, taking consideration of the regional asymmetry of 
productivity of public capital and the existence of capital accumulation. The aim of this 
paper is to verify how the taxation policy affects asymmetric equilibrium based on a 
simulation analysis using an overlapping generations model in two regions. 
It is assumed that the public capital as a public input is formed on the basis of the 
capital tax of local governments and the lump-sum tax of the central government. As 
demonstrated in related literature, the optimal capital tax rate should become zero 
when the lump-sum tax is imposed only on older generations, however, the optimal tax 
rate may become positive when it is imposed proportionally on younger and older 
generations. In the asymmetric equilibrium, several cooperative solutions can possibly 
exist which can achieve a higher welfare standard than the actualized cooperative 
solution either in Region1 or 2.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
The optimal theory of public investment is crucially important, which determines its 
level from the point of the efficiency of resource allocation, assuming that public 
investment is maintained as the public capital and focusing on the stock effects 
improving productivity or enhancing utility.  Many researches in normative analyses 
of public investment, such as Arrow-Kurz (1970), Sandmo-Dreze (1970), Ogura-Yohe 
(1977), Burgess (1988), or Yakita (1993), have shown their interest in the social 
discount rate for an optimal level.    
The government structure, as a supply body, is one of the key issues when 
considering an optimal provision of public investment as well as supply rules such the 
discount rate. In other words, we need to verify theoretically and empirically which is 
more desirable for an efficient provision of public capital.  Centralized or 
decentralized financial system.  
We can say that the necessity has been increasing to examine how the efficient level 
of public capital is determined under the Japanese circumstances where 
decentralization has been accelerating. The Fiscal Competition theory clarifies that a 
decentralized decision on the tax rate or expenditure level may possibly bring 
inefficiency in an economy where tax-related regional migration such as capital or 
labor occurs.  It can be a theory which meets the needs. However, only a few 
theoretical considerations of fiscal competition have been made in relation to the 
optimal provision of public capital.  
Upon analyzing the optimal provision of public capital within the framework of fiscal 
competition supposing the regional migration of private capital, the following two 
points may be considered important:  Firstly, when public investment is assumed to 
contribute to the productivity improvement as a production input, it is necessary to 
give an analysis to consider the difference of the productivity effects among regions. 
Specifically, an analysis with a model based on regional differences in productivity 
should be made, since there is a consensus that significant differences exist among 
regions on the productivity effects of public capital. 
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Secondly, an analysis to model the accumulation process of private capital is needed 
in order to examine the stock effects of public capital. It would be possible to make a 
deep analysis about the effects that not only the regional allocation of private capital 
but also its fluctuation in the whole economy gives on welfare, by adopting a dynamic 
model based on capital accumulation.  To examine how policy variables such as the 
tax rate or expenditure level of a local government under fiscal competition give impact 
on capital mobility or capital accumulation will lead to a possible analysis of the 
dynamic impact of governmental policy choice on welfare.  
In this paper, we extend a static framework with constant capital supply, based on 
regional symmetry which has been used in the general fiscal competition model, to a 
dynamic framework incorporating a capital accumulation process in consideration of 
relevance to the optimal provision of public capital.  Concretely, we expand the static 
capital competition model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) to an 
overlapping generations model. We make an analysis on the policy consequence of 
dynamic tax competition incorporating asymmetry of productivity effects of public 
capital, which has not fully explained by previous studies.   
We adopt an approach to conduce to a quantitative outcome by making a simulation 
analysis of an overlapping generations model within two regions.  We do not use an 
approach to lead to a qualitative outcome based on a theoretic analysis because our 
aim in this paper is to examine the capital tax rate, public capital level, and also 
complicated impacts on the social welfare in consideration of capital accumulation and 
non-homogeneity of productivity.   
In Chapter 2, we review related literature about theoretical analyses on fiscal 
competition to clarify our position in this paper. In Chapter 3, we describe the 
households in each region and the optimal action of firms for the overlapping 
generations model within two regions, and the object function and budget constraint of 
local governments and the central government. Then, we give a simulation analysis on 
a policy consequence of capital tax competition for symmetric and asymmetric cases of 
productivity effects in Chapter 4.  Finally, we summarize our conclusion and describe 
pending issues.   
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2. Related literature. 
 
Many researches on Fiscal Competition theory have been done since late 1980s.   
The theory has evolved to a framework which clarifies the consequence of competition 
over various policy variables among local governments, including tax competition, 
expenditure competition, and redistribution competition. It has now been recognized 
as one of the major research area in public economics.  Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986) and Wilson (1986) marked the beginning on the basis of capital tax competition. 
Their studies were focused on tax-related regional migration such as capital or labor, 
and on what impacts competitive and uncooperative policy decisions by local 
governments might give on the regional public goods provision.   
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) theoretically clarified that the 
capital tax competition among local governments under capital flow could induce the 
underprovision of public goods, and consequently the reduction of resident welfare.  
Wildasin (1988) expanded the policy competition, which Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986) and Wilson (1986) discussed only in relation to the capital tax rate, to a 
framework encompassing competition over the standards of public goods provision.  It 
showed that the equilibrium point would differ when the tax rate or public expenditure 
was chosen for policy variables. It further indicated that there would be differences in 
the deviation range from the optimal point.    
In addition to the issues of policy variables, many researches have modified or 
expanded the capital tax competition model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and 
Wilson (1986).  Their main interests have been to clarify theoretical consequences of 
the capital tax competition in the following three cases: 1) when public capital (public 
goods) contributes to the improvement of local productivity as a public input; 2) when 
the regions are heterogeneous or their sizes are large; 3) The capital amount of the 
whole economy fluctuates. 
Noisit (1995) and Noisit and Oakland (1995) gave a theoretical consideration on the 
possibility whether the capital tax competition could cause the overprovision of public 
goods. They emphasized that lowering capital tax rate could prevent private capital 
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from outflowing on one hand, but it could induce decrease of public capital (public 
goods) contributing as a public input on the other hand, which would bring on decrease 
in the marginal productivity of private capital and would eventually promote 
outflowing of private capital.  They also maintained that the cut-down in capital tax 
rate would not necessarily induce any increase of tax-related capital depending on the 
size of the effects.  
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) made a theoretical analysis on the capital tax 
rate in relation to two heterogeneous regions with different population size.  They 
indicated that asymmetric equilibrium in heterogeneous regions would be actualized 
unlike symmetric equilibrium heterogeneous regions, however, the resident welfare 
would become higher in less populated regions which chose relatively lower tax rate 
than in populated regions.   
Piekkola (1995), Wildasin (2003), Kellermann (2006) and Kellermann (2007) gave 
theoretical consideration on dynamic capital tax competition in reflection of the 
consumption and saving choices at different time points, when easing the assumption 
that the capital amount of the whole economy was constant.  Piekkola (1995) 
analyzed a consequence of dynamic capital tax competion based on an overlapping 
generations model, on the contrary Wildasin (2003) made an analysis on the basis of 
the Ramsey model.  Kellermann (2006) and Kellermann (2007) suggested that there 
would be a possibility for capital tax competition to induce inefficiency in resource 
allocation, based on the assumption that public capital was incorporated as a public 
input in small homogeneous regions.   
The research on capital tax competition, which was started by Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) has extended from an analysis of symmetric 
equilibrium in homogeneous regions to that of asymmetric equilibrium in 
heterogeneous regions, and moreover from a static framework without the issue of 
consumption and saving choices to a dynamic framework.  Nevertheless, there are few 
researches using dynamic capital tax competition model, which explicitly treated 
public capital as a public input, other than Kellermann (2006)  and Kellermann 
(2007). 
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Furthermore,  Kellermann (2006) and Kellermann (2007) as well as Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) were based on an assumption of small and 
homogeneous regions where the fluctuation of capital tax rate would not give any 
influence on the rate of return on capital.  There is no research that dealt with a 
dynamic capital tax competition within large and heterogeneous regions which have a 
difference in contribution to the productivity of public capital.   
Here in this paper, we focus on this issue.  We use the overlapping generations 
model of Diamond (1965) and construct a dynamic capital tax competition model 
incorporating public capital as a production function.  We, on the basis of simulation 
analysis, clarify how much impact the change of policy variables gives to asymmetric 
equilibrium. 
 
3. Theoretical model.  
 
In this paper, we give an analysis on tax competition based on the case where two 
regions procure public investment funds through capital tax, given that two regions 
receive fiscal transfer from the central government.  Public capital, provided for by 
public investment, is used as a public input.  Representative firms in each region 
produce goods with public inputs of labor, private capital and public capital based on 
their own production techniques.  Population, utility function of a representative 
household, and goods produced in both regions are identical. The two regions are 
differentiated only by the production technique. 
We use the overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) for a dynamic process 
of public as well as private capital accumulation, and expand the model to two regions 
by putting in public capital from governments as a public input.  Each region has 
younger generations born in time t and older generations born in time t-1. When their 
populations are respectively  and  and the population growth rate is , the 
equation  is formed.  The population in each region is equal and there 
is no regional migration.  In what follows, we describe behaviors of firms, households, 
governments, and then the market equilibrium.  
itL 1−itL n
( ) 11 −+= itit LnL
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3-1. Firms.  
 
Firms in Region i (i=1,2) produce goods ( ) using the linear homogeneous 
production function ( ) by means of labor ( ), private capital ( ), and 
public capital ( ) as productive inputs
itY
( itititi GKLF ,, )
itit
itL itK
itG 1 。 Firms solve the following profit 
maximization problem with public capital ( ) and production technique: itG
 
ititititititKL
KrLwYMAX −−=Π  
,
         (1) 
),,(            . itititiit GKLFYts =             (2) 
 
itw  means the wage rate and  means the rate of return on capital.  Due to the 
first order condition of profit maximization, 
itr
itiit LFw ∂∂=  and itiit KFr ∂∂=  are 
derived.  Accordingly, the profit shall be ( ) itititit GGF ∂∂=Π .  It is assumed that 
the profit should be distributed to the capital K .   The rate of return of capitalρ 
shall be itititit Kr Π+=ρ . Income distribution shall be ittititit KLwY ρ+= .  
Similarly to the Diamond model, we assume that the labor supply is fixed.  The 
production volume, private capital and public capital shall be described as 1 unit of 
labor.  The rate of return on capital and income distribution shall be: 
 
( )
it
ititi
itit k
ggfr ∂∂+=ρ              (3) 
itititit kwy ρ+=              (4) 
 
For this purpose, LFf = , LGg = , LYy = , LKk = .  When the production 
function is specified as , a 
Cobb-Douglas function, the capital demand and wage rate shall be expressed as follows 
for  and
K
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For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that labor has no regional migration 
whereas capital freely moves between the regions.  When the rate of return on capital 
differs between the regions, capital moves to the region with a higher rate of return on 
capital, under the condition that tax shall be imposed on the return of capital at the 
rate of iτ .  Assuming that the rate of return on capital is θ  after tax, θ  shall be 
equal between the regions due to the capital movement, the following equation shall be 
derived:    
 
( ) ititt ρτθ −= 1                  (7) 
 
 
Based on equation (7), the capital demand and wage rate shall be represented as 
follows for the functions tθ  and itτ :   
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3-2. households. 
 
Assuming that households in region i (i=1,2) consume  during earlier life (time t) 
and  during older life (time t+1), they are facing the following utility 
y
itc
o
itc 1+
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maximization problem under budget constraints:  
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The utility function μ  means the elasticity of substitution between different time 
points, δ  means the subjective rate of time preference.   represents savings,  
and  are the lump-sum taxes respectively imposed during early life and older life.  
The following consumption function and savings function are derived by solving this 
maximization problem:  
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whereαis marginal propensity of consumption and ( )
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When the parameter μ  of the utility function is 1, the marginal propensity of 
consumption shall be the invariable 
1
1
11
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++= δα . 
  
3-3. Government budget constraints.  
 
This model requires the central government and two local governments.  The 
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central government imposes ( )oityit tt ,  as a lump-sum tax on households in the two 
regions, and uses it as , or the funds for fiscal transfer. On the other hand, the 
local government collects capital taxes from firms of its own region, and uses them as 
, or the funds for public investment.  Public investment of each region is 
.  The budget constraint equation of the government shall be described as 
follows: 
C
itIG
L
itIG
L
it
C
it IGIG +
 
( )LitCititit IGIGGG ++=+ 1              (13) 
o
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y
itt
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L
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3-4. Market equilibrium. 
 
Produced goods and capital in the two regions are transferable within the regions.  
The equilibrium of the capital market can be formed when the capital demand of both 
regions is equivalent to their capital supply.  Therefore, it shall be described as 
follows:  
    
∑∑ += 2 12 ititit KsL == 11 ii                      (16) 
 
 
When the equilibrium of the capital market is established, the balance equation 
shall be derived as follows, by assigning equation (15) to equation (16) from equation 
(6):   
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑∑∑∑ ++− −+−++= 2 12 12 12 ititititoitityititit GGKKcLcLY ==== 1111 iiii      (17) 
 
The private capital demand shall be the function of ( )11 ,, ++ ititt gτθ  with equation (5)’. 
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The capital supply shall be the function of ( )oityittit ttw 11 ,,, ++θ  in accordance with 
equation (12).   represents the function of w ( )ititt g,,τθ  according to equation (6)’, 
accordingly capital supply shall be the function of ( )11,,,, ++ itoityititt gttτθ .  When the 
government policy variable ( )11 ,,,, ++ ititoityitit ggttτ  is given, the capital market 
equilibrium of equation (16) can be represented as a dynamic system of ( )1, +tt θθ .  In 
what follows, it is assumed that the government policy variable is ( )ioiyii gtt ,,,τ  and 
constant all the time, and θ  holds steady state for a long term.  Also,  and iw iρ  
are constant as well as the per capita variables , ,  and . y
i
c oic is ik
  
3-5. Policy objectives in a long-term steady state.  
 
Here, we summarize the policy objectives, policy instruments and constrained 
conditions of the central and local governments.  The local governments are given the 
fiscal transfer  from the central government, the taxes C
i
dG ( )oiyi tt ,  from their own 
residents, and the capital tax rate i≠τ  from the other region.  They decide the capital 
tax rate iτ  based to provide the public investment .  The policy 
objective of the local governments here is to determine the standard of 
i
L
i
C
i dGdGdG =+
iτ  so that the 
utility of their own residents becomes highest.  When using the consumption function 
of equation (11), the indirect utility function ( )oiyiii ttwv ,,,θ  shall be derived.  
Therefore, the objective function of the local governments shall be formulated as:  
  
),,,(  oi
y
iii ttwvMAX θτ ,i           (18) 
 iii
oy k
n
ttngts ρτ+++= 1        ..              (19) 
 
Equation (19) is a representation of the steady state amount per capita from equations 
(13), (14) and (15), which show the government budget constraints.  Each local 
government i≠τ  is given the capital tax rate of the other region, and compete against 
each other over the standard of such tax rate iτ .   
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As for the measures how the central government involves in the capital tax 
competition, a mediation or assignation pertaining to the capital tax rate can be as an 
option other than the lump sum tax of equation (14). In this case, the objective 
function of the central government is assumed to be the following social welfare 
function:   
 
γ
γγ )()(  21
∗∗ += vvW                   (20) 
 
4. Simulation analysis. 
 
In this chapter, we give a simulation analysis on the relevance between the standard 
of policy variables, for the lump-sum as well as the capital taxes, and the economic 
welfare.  For this purpose, we look at the cases that the local governments form public 
capital using the lump-sum and capital taxes on the basis of the overlapping 
generations model within two regions constructed in the previous chapter.  For the 
purpose of shorthand, it is assumed that 1 ,1 ,1 212121 ====== μμδδnn ,  and also 
γ , the social significance between the regions for the social welfare function, is 12. 
In what follows, we first make a simulation analysis on the standard of a lump-sum 
tax and the capital tax rate, which realize the maximization of social welfare for the 
case where the central government can choose an instrument for financial resources 
procurement without any constraints in Subchapter 4-1.  Next in 4-2, we give a 
simulation analysis on the capital tax competition in the case where the productivity is 
symmetric between the two regions, assuming that the central government can only 
choose the lump-sum tax.  Finally in 4-3, we make another simulation analysis on the 
capital tax rate in the case where the labor and productivity of public capital are 
asymmetric between the regions based on the same assumption as 4-2.  
 
                                                  
2 This means that the social welfare function is a Benthamite type.  
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4-1. Only the central government does financial resources procurement.  
  
Firstly, we look at the case where only the central government does financial 
resources procurement for public capital on the condition that it can choose any 
procuring instrument without constraints.  The central government does fiscal 
transfer, or subsidies in other words, imposes lump-sum taxes on younger and older 
generations and also collects capital taxes.  On the other hand, the local governments 
form their public capital, or local public goods in other words, based on the financial 
resources from capital taxes and fiscal transfer from the central government.  It is 
assumed that the productivity is symmetric between the two regions 
( ).  Figures 4-1-1 and 4-1-2 show the 
standards of social welfare which are determined by the combination of the capital tax 
rate and the standard of fiscal transfer.  A circle with vertically-striped pattern 
indicates the grand optimum which maximizes social welfare.  In the case where a 
lump-sum tax is imposed only on older generations ( ), the fiscal transfer 
standard to maximize social welfare shall be 670, and the capital tax rate shall be 0.  
In this case, the impact on capital accumulation is almost neutralized and distortion 
from the capital tax occurs.  Accordingly, such simulation result is derived which 
follows the conclusion of related literature based on a static framework, or the optimal 
capital tax rate is 0.   
2.0 ,3.0 ,5.0 212121 ====== GGKKLL ββββββ
0=yt
Meanwhile, in the case where a lump-sum tax is imposed on younger and older 
generations ( ), the fiscal transfer standard to maximize social welfare shall be 0, 
and the capital tax rate shall be 0.65.  This result is different from that of related 
literature showing that the optimal capital tax rate is 0.  We will further discuss the 
mechanism why the capital tax rate is not zero in Subchapters 4-2 and 4-3. Briefly, it 
can be explained as follows:  The optimal rate is determined based on a standard 
which achieves a balance between the effects eliminating any negative impact on 
capital accumulation from the lump-sum tax on younger generation by elevating the 
capital tax rate, which leads to the decrease of capital tax, and any welfare loss caused 
by the distortion from capital tax.  Thus, the tax rate shall not become zero.   
oy tt =
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Figure 4-1-1:  Optimal fiscal transfer (subsidies) and optimal capital tax rate ( )  0=yt
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Figure 4-1-2:  Optimal fiscal transfer (subsidies) and optimal capital tax rate ( )  oy tt =
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Note:  Circles with vertically-striped pattern indicate the grand optimums which maximize social 
welfare.  
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4-2. Capital tax competition within the symmetric regions.  
 
Next, we look at the case where the central government procures financial resources 
for public capital from lump-sum taxes whereas the local governments do from the 
capital taxes.  It is assumed that the productivity is symmetric between the two 
regions and the regions compete against each other over the capital tax rate based on 
the condition that each government is given the other’s actions.  The central 
government does fiscal transfer to local governments using lump-sum taxes as its 
financial resources.  It has an option to impose tax only on older generation ( ) or 
to equally impose on both older and younger generations ( ).  Also, the public 
capital standard made available by the fiscal transfer from the central government is 
100.  
0=yt
oy tt =
Figures 4-2-1 and 4-2-2 show Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solutions and 
optimal solutions (or social welfare maximization point) in symmetric regions with the  
same productivity.   It is based on an assumption of symmetric regions, and the 
cooperative solution and the optimal solution is identical.  Also, it leads to the same 
consequence whether the local governments realize policy coordination or the central 
government intervene in the capital tax competition between the local governments. 
Social welfare becomes higher than the Nash equilibrium solution when the 
cooperative solution is equal to the optimal solution, in both cases where only older 
generations are imposed a lump-sum tax (figure 4-2-1) and where both generations are 
equally imposed lump-sum taxes (figure 4-2-2). 
The capital tax rates, , of the Nash equilibrium solution and the cooperative solution 
equaling the optimal solution, are respectively 0.4 and 0.55 in the cases where the tax 
is imposed only on older generations whereas they are 0.4 and 0.65 in the cases where 
the tax is equally imposed on both generations.  The standards are not the same, 
however, the capital tax rate of the Nash equilibrium solution becomes lower than that 
of the cooperative solution equaling the optimal solution.  It can be said that a 
simulation result is obtained consistent with the theory of the capital tax competition, 
which has shown the tax rate would become lower the optimal standard due to the  
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Figure 4-2-1:   Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution 
in symmetric regions (in the case of ). 0=yt
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Figure 4-2-2:    Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution 
in symmetric regions (in the case of ). oy tt =
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Note 1: Circles with vertically-striped pattern indicate the optimal solutions, and those with 
lateral-striped pattern indicate the Nash equilibrium solutions. 
Note 2:  Reaction functions are shown on the τ1-τ2 plain. 
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capital tax competition within symmetric regions, and has also indicated that 
decreased welfare by underprovision of public goods due to the cut down of the capital 
tax rate could be improved by collaboration between the local governments or 
intervention by the central government.  
Interestingly, the case of equal taxation on both generations shows a bigger 
divergence between the capital tax rates of the Nash equilibrium solution and the 
cooperative solution equaling the optimal solution, in comparison with the case where 
the tax is imposed only on older generations.  We here discuss the factors based on 
Tables 4-2-3 and 4-2-4.  These tables show the variables in simulation. 
In the case of equal taxation on both older and younger generations, because capital 
accumulation is blocked by the lump-sum tax on younger generations, savings  and 
private capital 
S
K  become smaller, compared to that where the tax is imposed only on 
older ones.  The capital tax rate of the Nash equilibrium solution is 0.4 in both cases, 
and the capital tax revenue ( Kτρ ) becomes smaller in the case of equal taxation on 
both generations.  Moreover, the standard of public capital ( ) supplied by the local 
governments becomes smaller, whose financial resources are based on the capital tax 
revenue, and the entire public capital (G ), including the public capital ( ) which is 
supplied by the financial resources based on fiscal transfer from the central 
government, also becomes smaller.  
LG
CG
 
Table 4-2-3:  Economic variables (symmetric regions, ) 0 ,100 == ytG
G Gl τ ρ θ w K S cy co
Optimal 536.47 436.47 0.55 5.21 2.35 793.58 152.18 304.37 489.21 818.59
536.47 436.47 0.55 5.21 2.35 793.58 152.18 304.37 489.21 818.59
Nash 387.36 287.36 0.40 5.29 3.18 718.39 135.69 271.39 447.00 933.46
387.36 287.36 0.40 5.29 3.18 718.39 135.69 271.39 447.00 933.46  
Table 4-2-4:  Economic variables (symmetric regions, ) oy ttG ==  ,100
G Gl τ ρ θ w K S cy co
Optimal 592.75 492.75 0.65 6.20 2.17 758.08 122.24 244.49 446.92 708.47
592.75 492.75 0.65 6.20 2.17 758.08 122.24 244.49 446.92 708.47
Nash 359.63 259.63 0.40 6.38 3.83 649.08 101.67 203.34 379.08 915.57
359.63 259.63 0.40 6.38 3.83 649.08 101.67 203.34 379.08 915.57  
Note:  Upper rank shows figures of Region 1 while lower rank indicates those of Region 2, for both of 
the optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium solution. 
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Meanwhile, the capital tax rate and public capital ( ) become larger in the case of 
equal taxation on both generations when the cooperative solution equals to the optimal 
solution.  This can be explained that the blocking effect of private capital 
accumulation by imposing a lump-sum tax on younger generations is stronger than the 
promotion effect by the cut down of the rate of return on capital (
LG
ρ ) through lowering 
the capital tax rate, and that leads to an increased provision of public capital, or the 
elevation of the capital tax rate, in order to improve the deteriorated social welfare.   
Therefore, it can be construed that the divergence between the capital tax rate of the 
Nash equilibrium solution and the cooperative solution equaling the optimal solution 
becomes bigger, comparing between lump-sum taxation only on older generations and 
equal taxation on both generations, when productivity is symmetric.  
 
4-3. Capital tax competition within the asymmetric regions.  
 
Now we look at the case where the local governments are competing against each 
other over the capital tax rate based on the condition that each government is given 
the other’s actions, when the labor and public capital productivity are asymmetric 
between the two regions.  Like the case in 4-2, it is assumed that the central 
government procures financial resources for public capital from lump-sum taxes 
whereas the local governments do from the capital taxes.  The central government 
has an option to impose tax only on older generation ( ) or to equally impose on 
both older and younger generations ( ).   
0=yt
oy tt =
Also, the public capital standard made available by the fiscal transfer from the 
central government is 100, just like the case in 4-2.  However, the parameters of 
production function in Region 1 are  whereas those in 
Region 2 are .  It means that the value of elasticity for 
RDP of public capital is relatively high, or that of labor is relatively low in Region1.  
Region 1 would be a metropolitan area and Region 2 would be a country area in 
2.0 ,3.0 ,5.0 111 === GKL βββ
15.0 ,3.0 ,55.0 222 === GKL βββ
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Japanese context3.  
Figures 4-3-1 and 4-3-2 show the Nash equilibrium solution, the cooperative solution 
and optimal solution (or social welfare maximization point) between asymmetric 
regions with a different productivity level. For both cases, one that the capital tax rate 
is imposed only on older generations (figure 4-3-1) and the other that a lump-sum tax 
is imposed equally on younger and older generations (figure 4-3-2), the social welfare is 
higher in the optimal solution than in the Nash equilibrium solution. The simulation 
result is the same as that of 4-2, which is based on symmetric regions.  
There are two distinctions in the simulation on the assumption of asymmetric 
regions.  Firstly, different tax rates are chosen between Region 1 and 2 for the capital 
tax in the Nash equilibrium solution as well as taxation equations for such tax 
( , ). More specifically, the rate is 0.4 in Region 1 and 0.2 in Region 2.    0=yt oy tt =
It is considered that there are two effects by lowering the capital tax rate.  One of 
them is to promote capital accumulation by attracting private capital to the region, and  
the other is to hinder capital accumulation by decreasing the provision of public capital． 
The reason why the capital tax rate in the Nash equilibrium solution becomes lower 
in Region 2 than in Region 1 can be explained that the productivity of public capital is 
relatively low in Region 2, and promoting capital accumulation by lowering the capital 
tax rate may improve the welfare more effectively than elevating the rate to increase 
public capital, which accordingly leads to the promotion of private capital 
accumulation. The result is consistent with related literature such as Bucovetsky 
(1991) and Wilson (1991) which theoretically clarified the tax competition between 
asymmetric regions4. 
The second distinction in the simulation on the assumption of asymmetric regions is 
that the optimal solution corresponds to one of the cooperative solutions in the 
simulation of asymmetric region, whereas the cooperative solution is perfectly 
matching the optimal solution in that of symmetric region.  By looking at each social  
                                                  
3 According to Homma and Tanaka (2004), the value of elasticity for RDP of public capital was 0.22 in 
a metropolitan area whereas that in a country area was 0.06. The result was based on a positive 
analysis using prefectural panel data between 1977 and 2000.  
4 Asymmetry between regions is described as not the difference of productivity but the difference of 
population in Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991).   
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Figure 4-3-1:  Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution in 
asymmetric regions (in the case of ). 0=yt
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Figure 4-3-2:  Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution in 
asymmetric regions (in the case of ). oy tt =
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Note 1: Circles with vertically-striped pattern indicate the optimal solutions, those with 
lateral-striped pattern indicate the Nash equilibrium, and those with checked pattern indicate the 
cooperative solutions. 
Note 2:  Reaction functions are shown on theτ1-τ2 plain. 
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welfare standard of Region 1 and 2, it is apparent that there are several cooperative 
solutions more favorable to Region 1 and several cooperative solutions more favorable 
to region2 as you can see in figures 4-3-1 and 4-3-2.  Any cooperative solutions show 
Pareto improvement than the Nash equilibrium solution, and policy coordination 
between the local governments under the capital tax competition can improve the 
welfare. 
The question is which cooperative solution can actualize such policy coordination.  
The local governments would have incentives to move from the Nash equilibrium 
solution to a cooperative solution given that policy coordination can make a Pareto 
improvement possible.  But another cooperative solution may exist which can possibly 
achieve a higher social welfare standard than the actualized cooperative solution 
either in Region 1 or 2.  It is, thus, realistic to consider that the cooperative solutions 
are dependent on the magnitude correlation of the bargaining power between the local 
governments.  
The optimal solution can be predominant over other cooperative solutions when the 
equity standard of the central government is a Benthamite type.  There is no 
predominance in welfare among cooperation solutions in the light of the efficiency 
standard5.  Under the circumstances where the central government involves, one 
cooperative solution among others shall be chosen as the optimal solution only when 
the central government has both of the efficiency and equity standards.  More 
specifically, the position of the optimal solution in simulation shall be correspondently 
determined when the social welfare function of the central government is defined as a 
Benthamite type.   
Similarly to the symmetric regions, from tables 4-3-3 and 4-3-4 showing each 
variable in the simulation, it can be said that both saving  and private capital S K  
are smaller in the case of equal taxation on both generation in the optimal solution and 
the Nash equilibrium solution than the case where the tax is imposed only on older 
generation because the lump-sum tax on younger generation hinders capital 
                                                  
5 Accordingly, it is not possible to set priorities among cooperative solutions from the perspective of 
the efficiency of resource allocation, since the utilities of Region 1 and 2 are on the utility possibility 
frontier in any cooperative solutions. 
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accumulation.  As we mentioned in 4-2, the reason can be explained that equal 
taxation on both generation has a bigger blocking effect.  
 
 Table 4-3-3:  Economic variables (asymmetric regions, ) 0 ,100 == ytG
G Gl τ ρ θ w K S cy co
Optimal 525.42 425.42 0.55 5.46 2.46 773.50 141.67 296.40 477.09 824.63
248.45 148.45 0.35 3.78 2.46 518.39 112.21 211.37 307.03 530.68
Nash 385.52 285.52 0.40 5.36 3.21 713.80 133.24 269.57 444.23 936.03
176.83 76.83 0.20 4.02 3.21 469.52 95.61 188.14 281.37 592.88  
Table 4-3-4:  Economic variables (asymmetric regions, ) oy ttG ==  ,100
G Gl τ ρ θ w K S cy co
Optimal 517.26 417.26 0.60 6.93 2.77 695.43 100.42 221.38 407.39 767.96
256.83 156.83 0.40 4.62 2.77 479.19 84.92 149.30 263.23 496.21
Nash 352.29 252.29 0.40 6.73 4.04 630.72 93.67 196.84 367.22 925.36
168.98 68.98 0.20 5.05 4.04 421.57 68.30 127.12 227.79 574.01  
Note:  Upper rank shows figures of Region 1 while lower rank indicates those of Region 2, for both of 
the optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium solution. 
 
When looking at the public capital standard ( ) in both regions at the optimal 
solution,  of Region 1 is greater in the case of taxation only on older generations 
(525.42) than that of equal taxation on both generations (517.26).  This means that 
the accumulation level of public capital is relatively low in the case of equal taxation. 
This can be because the sensitivity of private capital for the capital tax rate 
G
G
τ  differs 
between Region 1 and 26.  Capital flight from Region 1 by the elevation of τ  exceeds 
that in Region 2, and the extent of decrease of private capital in Region 1 becomes 
larger.  Therefore, the capital tax revenue in the case of equal taxation becomes 
smaller than that of taxation only on older generations.  It is accordingly considered 
that  in Region 1 becomes relatively small, which leads to lower the welfare of 
Region 1.   
G
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
In this paper, we have shown some important policy implications on the capital tax 
competition as financial resources of public investment, by considering the effects of 
                                                  
6 In other words, the gradient of the capital demand function is different between Region 1 and 2.  
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accumulation of public and private capitals over the production and by explaining such 
accumulation using an overlapping generations model.  We have also confirmed from 
our dynamic model that the Nash equilibrium solution of capital tax competition, 
which has been indicated by the traditional static model, choose a lower capital tax 
rate than the optimal solution.  Now, we summarize our contribution in connection 
with model expansion.   
The first distinction is that we have given an analysis taking the productivity effects 
of public capital into consideration based on a dynamic mode.  Public capital 
contributes not only to public input in itself, but also to increase the private capital 
demand. This means that it leads to the increase of capital tax revenue.   
As to adopting the capital tax for financial resources of public investment, it is 
necessary to consider the inefficiency from distortion brought by the capital tax as well 
as the positive effects generated by the increase of public capital.  In accordance with 
our simulation analysis in this paper, it is confirmed that the optimal capital tax rate 
at the Nash equilibrium solution falls below that at the optimal solution, even in the 
case where the effect of public capital to uplift the private capital demand.    
The second distinction is that we have indicated there is a case where the capital tax 
rate becomes a positive number at the optimal solution by adopting an overlapping 
generations model, contrary to some related literature supporting that the optimal 
capital tax rate becomes zero with a static model, which is a traditional model of the 
capital tax competition.  It can be said that the conclusion, which shows the rate 
becoming zero with a static model is limited to a case where the lump-sum tax is 
imposed only on older generations with an overlapping generations model.  When 
taking the productivity effects of public and private capitals into consideration, it is 
important not to overlook the effects of taxation on capital accumulation. It is essential 
to model a dynamic process of capital accumulation for this analysis.  
Our analysis in this paper shows an expansion from the traditional capital tax 
competition model.  We analyze taxation effects by using an overlapping generations 
model and demonstrating that savings at early life form private capital. The result of 
simulation analysis indicates that the lump-sum tax on younger generations has an 
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effect to decrease their savings, in comparison with the capital tax.  Accordingly, the 
capital taxation has primacy in the aspect of capital accumulation.     
Thirdly, we show there is more than one cooperative solution in addition to the Nash 
equilibrium solution and the optimal solution by modeling a case where the public 
capital productivity is different in two regions.  The existence of plural optimal 
cooperative solutions gives a new point, such as negotiation between local governments 
or mediation of the central government, to the issue of which cooperative solution 
should be chosen.  The optimal solution in this paper is one of the cooperative 
solutions. It is the solution chosen by the central government’s adoption of a 
Benthamite social welfare function.  
Now, we would like to note some pending issues.  Firstly, it should be noted the 
analysis result shown in this paper may possibly be dependent on the parameters of 
specified utility function and production function in the simulation.  A simulation 
analysis makes it possible to analyze with more complicated model.  This is one of the 
advantages of simulation analysis. Our analysis in this paper is a combination of the 
analyses of related literature and the conclusion obtained here is organically connected 
with preceding conclusions.  
Our conclusion here is a consequence led by a choice of policy variable based on the 
assumption of a constant parameter, whereas the related literature has uses a 
theoretic model to lead a qualitative conclusion.  Deliberate sensitivity analysis is 
indispensable in order to improve the generality of analysis.  
We can point out as the second issue that the options of policy instruments by the 
central government and local governments are limited.  We discuss the lump-sum tax 
and capital tax as financial resources for public investment and expanded them in 
comparison with related literature.  Our contribution here is that we have integrated 
heterogeneity in the sense that the two regions have different production techniques, 
however, it is based on an assumption that the central government takes a symmetric 
policy in fiscal transfer and taxation on both regions whereas the local government 
adopt an asymmetric policy.  
According to our analysis, there is a regional disparity, specifically the utility 
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standard is lower in Region 2 than Region 1.  It may suggest that an asymmetric 
policy should be chosen for the purpose of regional redistribution.  The central 
government applies different capital tax rates by region at the viewpoint of 
maximizing the social welfare function, to illustrate.  It is important to consider the 
consequences when an asymmetric policy is chosen and to compare them with 
symmetric cases.    
Thirdly, our analysis only makes comparison in the long-term steady state.  We 
have indicated that the Nash equilibrium solution chooses a lower capital tax rate 
than the optimal solution does.  It means that the utility rises at the optimal solution 
higher than at the Nash equilibrium solution due to the increased amount of public 
investment and elevation of the capital tax rate.  It should be noted, however, that 
this is based on the comparison of two steady states.   
The result may be different in a transition process by any policy changes from that in 
the steady state. It is necessary to study the role of policy in the transition process 
besides in the steady state.  In that case, such analysis should be made with a social 
discount rate, a new standard for the social welfare function.   
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Appendix 
 
Table 4-1-1:  Optimal fiscal transfer (subsidies) and optimal capital tax rate ( )  0=yt
 
 
Table 4-1-2:  Optimal fiscal transfer (subsidies) and optimal capital tax rate ( )  oy tt =
 
Note:  Figures in the tables indicate those of social welfare. Only proximities of the optimal points 
are shown. 
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Table 4-2-1:   Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution 
in symmetric regions (in the case of ). 0=yt
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.3 9.476 9.490 9.505 9.520 9.536 9.552 9.569 9.585 9.599
0.35 9.487 9.502 9.518 9.535 9.552 9.570 9.589 9.606 9.623
0.4 9.488 9.505 9.522 9.540 9.560 9.579 9.600 9.620 9.639
0.45 9.480 9.497 9.516 9.536 9.557 9.579 9.602 9.624 9.647
0.5 9.460 9.479 9.499 9.521 9.544 9.569 9.594 9.619 9.645
0.55 9.428 9.448 9.470 9.494 9.520 9.547 9.575 9.604 9.634
0.6 9.381 9.403 9.427 9.453 9.481 9.511 9.543 9.576 9.611
0.65 9.316 9.340 9.366 9.394 9.425 9.459 9.495 9.533 9.573
0.7 9.228 9.254 9.282 9.313 9.347 9.384 9.425 9.469
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.3 9.476 9.487 9.488 9.480 9.460 9.428 9.381 9.316 9.228
0.35 9.490 9.502 9.505 9.497 9.479 9.448 9.403 9.340 9.254
0.4 9.505 9.518 9.522 9.516 9.499 9.470 9.427 9.366 9.282
0.45 9.520 9.535 9.540 9.536 9.521 9.494 9.453 9.394 9.313
0.5 9.536 9.552 9.560 9.557 9.544 9.520 9.481 9.425 9.347
0.55 9.552 9.570 9.579 9.579 9.569 9.547 9.511 9.459 9.384
0.6 9.569 9.589 9.600 9.602 9.594 9.575 9.543 9.495 9.425
0.65 9.585 9.606 9.620 9.624 9.619 9.604 9.576 9.533 9.469
0.7 9.599 9.623 9.639 9.647 9.645 9.634 9.611 9.573
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.3 18.951 18.976 18.993 19.000 18.996 18.980 18.950 18.901 18.828
0.35 18.976 19.004 19.023 19.032 19.031 19.019 18.992 18.946 18.877
0.4 18.993 19.023 19.044 19.056 19.059 19.050 19.027 18.986 18.921
0.45 19.000 19.032 19.056 19.072 19.078 19.073 19.055 19.019 18.959
0.5 18.996 19.031 19.059 19.078 19.089 19.088 19.075 19.045 18.992
0.55 18.980 19.019 19.050 19.073 19.088 19.093 19.086 19.063 19.018
0.6 18.950 18.992 19.027 19.055 19.075 19.086 19.086 19.071 19.035
0.65 18.901 18.946 18.986 19.019 19.045 19.063 19.071 19.066 19.042
0.7 18.828 18.877 18.921 18.959 18.992 19.018 19.035 19.042
τ2
τ1
τ2
u1+u2
τ2
τ1
τ1
u1
u2
 
Table 4-2-2:    Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution 
in symmetric regions (in the case of ). oy tt =
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.3 9.289 9.307 9.326 9.345 9.364 9.383 9.402 9.420 9.435
0.35 9.302 9.321 9.342 9.362 9.383 9.404 9.425 9.445 9.463
0.4 9.305 9.326 9.348 9.370 9.393 9.416 9.439 9.461 9.482
0.45 9.297 9.319 9.343 9.367 9.392 9.418 9.443 9.468 9.492
0.5 9.277 9.301 9.327 9.353 9.381 9.409 9.438 9.466 9.493
0.55 9.244 9.270 9.298 9.327 9.357 9.388 9.420 9.453 9.485
0.6 9.195 9.224 9.253 9.285 9.318 9.353 9.389 9.426 9.464
0.65 9.127 9.157 9.190 9.224 9.261 9.300 9.341 9.384 9.428
0.7 9.033 9.066 9.101 9.139 9.180 9.224 9.271 9.320 9.371
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.3 9.289 9.302 9.305 9.297 9.277 9.244 9.195 9.127 9.033
0.35 9.307 9.321 9.326 9.319 9.301 9.270 9.224 9.157 9.066
0.4 9.326 9.342 9.348 9.343 9.327 9.298 9.253 9.190 9.101
0.45 9.345 9.362 9.370 9.367 9.353 9.327 9.285 9.224 9.139
0.5 9.364 9.383 9.393 9.392 9.381 9.357 9.318 9.261 9.180
0.55 9.383 9.404 9.416 9.418 9.409 9.388 9.353 9.300 9.224
0.6 9.402 9.425 9.439 9.443 9.438 9.420 9.389 9.341 9.271
0.65 9.420 9.445 9.461 9.468 9.466 9.453 9.426 9.384 9.320
0.7 9.435 9.463 9.482 9.492 9.493 9.485 9.464 9.428 9.371
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.3 18.577 18.609 18.630 18.642 18.642 18.628 18.597 18.546 18.468
0.35 18.609 18.643 18.667 18.682 18.685 18.675 18.649 18.602 18.528
0.4 18.630 18.667 18.695 18.713 18.720 18.714 18.692 18.651 18.583
0.45 18.642 18.682 18.713 18.735 18.746 18.745 18.728 18.693 18.632
0.5 18.642 18.685 18.720 18.746 18.762 18.766 18.756 18.727 18.674
0.55 18.628 18.675 18.714 18.745 18.766 18.777 18.774 18.753 18.709
0.6 18.597 18.649 18.692 18.728 18.756 18.774 18.779 18.768 18.734
0.65 18.546 18.602 18.651 18.693 18.727 18.753 18.768 18.768 18.747
0.7 18.468 18.528 18.583 18.632 18.674 18.709 18.734 18.747 18.743
τ2
τ1
τ1
u1
u2
τ2
τ1
τ2
u1+u2
 
Note 1:  Figures in the tables indicate those of social welfare. 
Note 2:  Figures in thick line frames show the optimal solutions, or the maximization points of social 
welfare, and those in double line frames show the Nash equilibrium solution. 
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Table 4-3-1:  Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution in 
asymmetric regions (in the case of ). 0=yt
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2 9.421 9.428 9.436 9.444 9.452 9.460 9.468 9.476 9.484
0.25 9.453 9.462 9.470 9.479 9.488 9.497 9.506 9.515 9.523
0.3 9.477 9.486 9.495 9.504 9.514 9.524 9.534 9.544 9.554
0.35 9.491 9.500 9.510 9.521 9.532 9.543 9.554 9.565 9.576
0.4 9.496 9.506 9.517 9.529 9.540 9.553 9.565 9.577 9.590
0.45 9.491 9.502 9.514 9.527 9.540 9.554 9.567 9.581 9.595
0.5 9.476 9.489 9.502 9.515 9.530 9.545 9.560 9.576 9.592
0.55 9.449 9.463 9.477 9.492 9.508 9.525 9.542 9.560 9.578
0.6 9.409 9.423 9.439 9.456 9.474 9.493 9.512 9.532 9.553
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2 8.775 8.782 8.783 8.777 8.765 8.745 8.717 8.681 8.635
0.25 8.784 8.792 8.794 8.789 8.777 8.757 8.730 8.695 8.650
0.3 8.794 8.803 8.806 8.801 8.790 8.772 8.745 8.711 8.666
0.35 8.804 8.815 8.818 8.815 8.805 8.787 8.762 8.728 8.685
0.4 8.816 8.827 8.832 8.830 8.821 8.804 8.780 8.747 8.705
0.45 8.828 8.841 8.847 8.846 8.838 8.822 8.799 8.768 8.727
0.5 8.841 8.855 8.863 8.863 8.856 8.842 8.821 8.791 8.752
0.55 8.854 8.871 8.879 8.881 8.876 8.864 8.844 8.816 8.779
0.6 8.869 8.886 8.897 8.901 8.897 8.887 8.869 8.844 8.809
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2 18.195 18.211 18.219 18.221 18.216 18.204 18.185 18.157 18.119
0.25 18.237 18.254 18.264 18.268 18.264 18.254 18.236 18.209 18.173
0.3 18.270 18.289 18.301 18.306 18.304 18.296 18.279 18.255 18.220
0.35 18.295 18.315 18.329 18.336 18.336 18.330 18.316 18.293 18.260
0.4 18.311 18.334 18.349 18.358 18.361 18.357 18.345 18.324 18.294
0.45 18.319 18.343 18.361 18.373 18.378 18.376 18.367 18.349 18.322
0.5 18.317 18.344 18.364 18.378 18.386 18.387 18.381 18.367 18.343
0.55 18.304 18.333 18.357 18.374 18.385 18.389 18.387 18.377 18.357
0.6 18.277 18.310 18.336 18.357 18.371 18.380 18.382 18.376 18.362
τ2
τ1
τ1
u1
u2
τ2
τ1
τ2
u1+u2
 
Table 4-3-2:  Nash equilibrium solution, cooperative solution and optimal solution in 
asymmetric regions (in the case of ). oy tt =
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2 9.209 9.219 9.229 9.240 9.250 9.260 9.270 9.279 9.288
0.25 9.244 9.255 9.267 9.278 9.289 9.300 9.311 9.321 9.331
0.3 9.270 9.282 9.294 9.306 9.319 9.331 9.343 9.354 9.365
0.35 9.286 9.299 9.312 9.326 9.339 9.352 9.365 9.378 9.391
0.4 9.293 9.307 9.321 9.335 9.350 9.365 9.379 9.394 9.408
0.45 9.290 9.304 9.320 9.335 9.351 9.368 9.384 9.400 9.416
0.5 9.275 9.291 9.308 9.325 9.342 9.360 9.378 9.397 9.415
0.55 9.247 9.265 9.283 9.302 9.321 9.341 9.362 9.382 9.403
0.6 9.204 9.224 9.244 9.265 9.286 9.309 9.332 9.355 9.379
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2 8.514 8.523 8.524 8.518 8.504 8.482 8.452 8.412 8.362
0.25 8.531 8.541 8.543 8.538 8.525 8.504 8.475 8.437 8.387
0.3 8.549 8.559 8.563 8.559 8.547 8.528 8.500 8.463 8.415
0.35 8.567 8.579 8.583 8.580 8.570 8.552 8.526 8.490 8.443
0.4 8.586 8.599 8.605 8.603 8.594 8.578 8.553 8.519 8.474
0.45 8.605 8.620 8.627 8.627 8.620 8.605 8.582 8.550 8.507
0.5 8.625 8.641 8.650 8.652 8.646 8.633 8.612 8.582 8.542
0.55 8.644 8.662 8.673 8.677 8.673 8.662 8.644 8.616 8.578
0.6 8.664 8.684 8.697 8.702 8.701 8.693 8.677 8.652 8.617
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2 17.723 17.741 17.753 17.757 17.754 17.742 17.722 17.692 17.650
0.25 17.775 17.796 17.809 17.815 17.814 17.804 17.786 17.758 17.719
0.3 17.819 17.841 17.857 17.865 17.866 17.858 17.843 17.817 17.780
0.35 17.853 17.878 17.896 17.906 17.909 17.904 17.891 17.868 17.834
0.4 17.879 17.906 17.926 17.939 17.944 17.943 17.932 17.913 17.882
0.45 17.894 17.924 17.947 17.962 17.971 17.973 17.966 17.950 17.923
0.5 17.899 17.932 17.957 17.976 17.989 17.993 17.990 17.979 17.956
0.55 17.892 17.927 17.956 17.979 17.995 18.004 18.005 17.998 17.981
0.6 17.869 17.908 17.940 17.967 17.987 18.001 18.008 18.007 17.996
τ2
τ1
τ2
u1+u2
τ2
τ1
τ1
u1
u2
 
Note 1:  Figures in the tables indicate those of social welfare. 
Note 2:  Figures in thick line frames show the optimal solutions, or the maximization points of social 
welfare, shadowed figures indicate the cooperative solutions, and those in double line frames show 
the Nash equilibrium solution. 
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